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Key points 
 
  Since the 2015 general election, the Westminster Government has initiated a further 
round of welfare reform.  The new figures in this report shows that by 2020-21 Scottish 
claimants can expect to lose just over £1bn a year as a result of the post-2015 reforms. 
  The biggest financial losses can be expected to arise from the four-year freeze in most 
working-age benefits (£300m a year) and from reductions in work allowances within 
Universal Credit (£250m).  The on-going changeover from Disability Living Allowance to 
Personal Independence Payments (£190m) and reductions in Tax Credits (£140m) also 
result in large losses. 
  The new, lower Benefit Cap will also affect far more households in Scotland – an 
estimated 11,000 compared to just 900 hit by the existing cap. 
  The new benefit changes come on top of the welfare reforms implemented between 
2010 and 2015.  These have already resulted in the loss to Scottish claimants of around 
£1.1bn a year – somewhat less than first forecast mainly due to the difficulty of bringing 
down spending on incapacity benefits (these days Employment and Support Allowance). 
  There are big variations in the anticipated financial losses across Scotland, with Glasgow 
City experiencing the largest losses in absolute terms and on a per capita basis.  Other 
older industrial areas across Scotland are also hit hard. 
  As a general rule, the more deprived the local authority, the greater the per capita 
financial ‘hit’. 
  The anticipated financial loss in Scotland – by 2020-21 an average of £300 a year per 
adult of working age – is broadly in line with the GB average.  In part this is because 
Scotland is exempt from the new ‘Pay to Stay’ arrangements for social housing tenants. 
  Parallel changes in tax allowances, the minimum wage, and childcare may go some way 
to offsetting the financial losses for some claimants but it is questionable whether the 
welfare reforms themselves will result in higher employment or increases in earnings. 
  The devolution of welfare powers should not obscure the continuing and dominant role 
that the UK Government plays in determining welfare spending in Scotland. 
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THE IMPACT ON SCOTLAND OF THE NEW WELFARE REFORMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope and purpose of the report 
 
The devolution to Scotland of new responsibilities for social security should not obscure the 
fact that control over the majority of welfare spending in Scotland remains with Westminster.  
And since the general election in May 2015, the UK government has announced a further 
major round of welfare reform.  This adds to the already substantial reforms introduced 
between 2010 and 2015. 
 
The purpose of this report is to document the anticipated impact of these new reforms on 
Scotland.  The focus is on how many people will be affected and on how much money will be 
lost by claimants.  The report also documents how the impact of the new reforms is likely to 
vary between local authorities. 
 
The new welfare reforms that impact on Scotland apply equally to all other parts of Britain 
but the impact is not necessarily the same because claimants are concentrated more in 
some places than others.  The financial losses in a particular city or town can be more – 
sometimes much more – than the UK average.  It is important to understand just how much 
Scotland as a whole and each of its constituent authorities can expect to lose. 
 
In a report to the Parliament’s Welfare Reform Committee in 20131, we documented the 
financial losses expected in Scotland as a result of the reforms implemented since 2010.  In 
follow-up reports we looked at the expected impact at ward level2, on different types of 
household3, and explored the effects on the Scottish labour market4.  These reports all drew 
on a unique UK-wide databank on the welfare reforms developed at Sheffield Hallam 
University. 
 
In looking at the impact of the new reforms the present report is essentially a parallel to the 
original 2013 report.  Our initial estimates of the impacts of the post-2015 reforms across the 
                                                          
1
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2013) The Impact of Welfare Reform on Scotland, Scottish Parliament, 
Edinburgh 
2
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2014) The Local Impact of Welfare Reform, Scottish Parliament, 
Edinburgh 
3
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2015) The Cumulative Impact of Welfare Reform on Households in 
Scotland, Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh 
4
 C Beatty, S Fothergill and D Houston (2015) The Impact of Welfare Reform on the Scottish Labour 
Market, Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh 
 4 
UK were published in a March 2016 report5 and subsequently received coverage in the 
Scottish press.  However, later the same month, in Budget 2016, the Treasury published 
revised estimates of the financial savings it expects to make as a result of the new reforms.  
All the figures in the present report have been revised to take the Treasury’s new figures into 
account so the estimates here are all new and up-to-date. 
 
A ‘health warning’ is nevertheless appropriate.  Estimating the impacts of welfare reform is 
an imprecise science.  This is partly because the course of the economy is uncertain (this 
affects claimant numbers), partly because claimants’ behaviour may change in response to 
the reforms, and sometimes because the available data is less than perfect.  The Treasury 
itself revised down its expectations of the financial savings arising from the post-2015 
reforms by more than £0.5bn a year between the 2015 Summer Budget and Autumn 
Statement and the 2016 Budget. 
 
All the figures for Scotland presented here take the Treasury’s expected financial savings as 
the starting point.  These UK-wide savings are then allocated to local areas principally on the 
basis of official statistics on claimant numbers and benefit spending in each area.  Full 
details of the methods applying to each of the new reforms are set out in the appendix.  The 
methods applying to the pre-2015 reforms are set out in our 2013 report to the Scottish 
Parliament6. 
 
 
The pre-2015 reforms: the outturn 
 
It is appropriate to begin by looking back at the impacts on Scotland of the pre-2015 welfare 
reforms because these help set the context for the new round of reforms.  The 2010-15 
Coalition government in Westminster implemented eight main reforms that led to financial 
losses for claimants in Scotland: 
 
Housing Benefit – Local Housing Allowance 
Changes to the rules governing assistance with the cost of housing for low-income 
households in the private rented sector.  The new rules apply to rent levels, ‘excess’ 
payments, property size, age limits for sole occupancy and indexation for inflation. 
 
Non-dependant deductions 
Increases in the deductions from Housing Benefit, Council Tax Support and other 
income-based benefits to reflect the contribution that non-dependant household 
members are expected to make towards the household’s housing costs 
 
Benefit cap 
New ceiling on total payments per household, applying to the sum of a wide range of 
benefits for working age claimants 
 
  
                                                          
5
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2016) The Uneven Impact of Welfare Reform: the financial losses to 
places and people, CRESR, Sheffield Hallam University 
6
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2013) op. cit. 
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Personal Independence Payments 
Replacement of Disability Living Allowance by PIP for working age claimants, 
including more stringent and frequent medical tests, as the basis for financial support 
to help offset the additional costs faced by individuals with disabilities 
 
Employment and Support Allowance 
Replacement of Incapacity Benefit and related benefits by ESA, with more stringent 
medical tests, greater conditionality and time-limiting of non-means tested entitlement 
for claimants in the Work-Related Activity Group 
 
Child Benefit 
Three-year freeze, and withdrawal of benefit from households including a higher 
earner 
 
Tax Credits 
Reductions in payment rates and eligibility for Child Tax Credit and Working Tax 
Credit, paid to lower and middle income households 
 
1 per cent up-rating 
Limit in annual up-rating of value of most working age benefits 
 
The majority of these welfare reforms were initiated by the Coalition government in 
Westminster but the introduction of ESA was a Labour measure that pre-dated 2010 and 
only took full effect later, whereas the time-limiting of non-means tested ESA entitlement was 
a Coalition innovation.  By March 2016 nearly all the pre-2015 reforms had come into full 
effect.  The important exception is the changeover from DLA to PIP, which is not expected to 
be completed until March 20187. 
 
It is important to note that the Westminster Government also introduced two other reforms 
that in the event did not impact on claimants in Scotland.  One of these was the new 
Housing Benefit rules on under-occupation in the social rented sector, popularly known as 
the bedroom tax.  In Scotland, the impact on claimants has been averted in full by the 
Scottish Government’s deployment of Discretionary Housing Payments.  The other reform 
averted from claimants was a reduction in Council Tax Support  arising from the 10 per 
cent cut in Westminster Government funding.  This reduction was absorbed within Scottish 
Government and local authority budgets.  In Scotland, the financial impact of these two 
welfare reforms – the bedroom tax and Council Tax Support – therefore fell on public sector 
budgets rather than benefit claimants. 
 
Additionally, the 2010-15 Coalition government began the introduction of Universal Credit.  
This is arguably the most ambitious reform of all because Universal Credit is set to replace 
nearly all means-tested benefits for working-age claimants.  However, the introduction of 
Universal Credit differs from the other reforms considered here because, in its original form 
at least, it was not intended to reduce overall welfare payments but rather to introduce a 
standardised withdrawal rate.  If Universal Credit reduced the overall benefit bill it would be 
by ‘making work pay’ in all circumstances.  In practice, the introduction of Universal Credit 
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has been long delayed and because of more recent decisions its introduction will now be 
associated with net reductions in entitlement.  These reductions are included in the figures 
we present for the post-2015 reforms. 
 
The list above of pre-2015 welfare reforms also omits the impact of benefit sanctions.  
What needs to be remembered here is that the power to impose sanctions is not new – it 
has been a feature of the benefit system since its inception.  What happened after 2010 is 
that sanctions were more widely applied, especially to those claiming Jobseeker’s 
Allowance, though the numbers and the rate do now appear to have peaked8.  The financial 
savings to the Treasury, though not negligible, are likely to be smaller than those arising 
from all but the most modest of the welfare reforms covered here9. 
 
Table 1 compares the initial estimate of the financial loss to claimants in Scotland arising 
from the pre-2015 welfare reforms, from our 2013 report10, with the revised estimate 
published in 201511 and the new estimated outturn by March 2016.  There are significant 
divergences. 
 
 
Table 1: Estimated financial loss to claimants in Scotland from pre-2015 welfare reforms 
  
Initial estimate 
(2013) 
£m p.a. 
Revised estimate 
(2015) 
£m p.a. 
Estimated outturn 
by March 2016 
£m p.a. 
Employment and Support Allowance 500 280 85 
Tax Credits 300 350 340 
1 per cent uprating 290 230 230 
Child Benefit 225 240 240 
Personal Independence Payments(1) 165 320 130 
Housing Benefit: LHA 80 80 80 
Housing Benefit: ‘bedroom tax’ 50 0 0 
Non-dependent deductions 30 20 20 
Benefit cap 15 4 3 
    
     
Total 1,660 1,520 1,130 
     
 
(1)Initial and revised estimates are for full impact by March 2018  
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data  
 
                                                          
8
 See the quarterly briefings on the DWP sanctions statistics produced by David Webster of Glasgow 
University 
9
 Other reforms that have been omitted are the reduction in the qualifying age of the youngest child 
exempting lone parents from looking for work, which does not reduce payment rates, and the 
changeover from RPI to CPI for benefits up-rating, introduced in 2011-12, which is a wider accounting 
reform affecting public sector pensions for example and has in practice been superseded by 
subsequent caps and freezes for most working-age benefits. 
10
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2013) op. cit. 
11
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2015) op. cit. 
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Overall, the financial loss to claimants in Scotland by March 2016 is estimated to be £1.1bn 
a year, which is equivalent to £330 for every person of working age (16-64).  This is only 
around two-thirds of the £1.6bn a year loss initially estimated.  Part of the difference is 
illusory however: the changeover from DLA to PIP was never expected to be completed until 
2018 and adding in the loss from this source still in the pipeline – by 2018 it is still expected 
to be £320m a year – brings the total loss from the pre-2015 welfare reforms to more than 
£1.3bn a year.  All the other pre-2015 reforms had taken full effect by March 2016. 
 
Furthermore, the outturn loss to claimants in Scotland excludes the impact of the ‘bedroom 
tax’, included in the initial figures, which the Scottish Government subsequently offset in full.  
The intervention of the Scottish Government and Scottish local authorities also averted any 
reduction in Council Tax Support arising from the cut in funding imposed by the Treasury. 
 
As we noted in our 2015 report, the effect of these interventions was to reduce the financial 
loss to claimants in Scotland by around £35 a year per adult of working age, equivalent to 
around 10 per cent of the overall loss that would otherwise have fallen on Scottish claimants 
by March 2016.  The Welsh Government and a number of local authorities in England also 
avoided passing on reductions in Council Tax Support to claimants but the intervention to 
head off the impact of the ‘bedroom tax’ is presently unique to Scotland. 
 
Employment and Support Allowance – the modern-day incapacity benefit – accounts for by 
far the largest shortfall between initial expectations and the outturn loss to claimants.  Three 
factors are at the root of this: 
  The new medical test (the Work Capability Assessment) has reduced numbers by far 
less than was anticipated, in part because following extensive criticism the test itself 
has undergone successive revisions.  The headline number of incapacity/ESA 
claimants across Britain as a whole is only down by around 100,000 (to 2.5m) though 
it could be argued that without the new medical test the numbers would have been 
higher in the wake of recession. 
  Following the medical test a much smaller proportion of ESA claimants have been 
placed in the Work-Related Activity Group than was originally expected.  Again, this 
is probably attributable in part to revisions to the Work Capability Assessment. 
  As a result of the smaller than anticipated numbers in the Work-Related Activity 
Group, the financial savings to the Treasury arising from the time-limiting of non-
means tested entitlement have been much less than was expected. 
 
There is nothing unusually Scottish in this lower than expected financial loss arising from 
incapacity benefit reform.  It has happened in all the UK regions.  On the other hand, 
Scotland has for many years had a high incapacity claimant rate so the shortfall in the 
Treasury’s anticipated savings has been proportionately greater in Scotland than in much of 
southern England, where the incapacity claimant rate is generally lower. 
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The losses arising from the cap of 1 per cent a year on the inflation uprating of most 
working-age benefits have also been lower than initially anticipated.  This reflects lower than 
expected inflation. 
 
Taken as a whole, the divergences between initial expectations and actual losses reflect 
events and uncertainties in the real world, and in some cases the Treasury’s own 
reassessment of the expected savings, rather than flaws in the methods deployed in this 
report and its predecessors.  The divergences do however underline the point that 
estimating the impacts of welfare reform is an imprecise science. 
 
 
The new welfare reforms 
 
The new welfare reforms impacting on Scotland, announced in the Summer Budget in July 
2015 and in the Spending Review and Autumn Statement in November 2015, are: 
 
 Universal Credit work allowances12 
Reduction in the level of earnings at which Universal Credit is withdrawn as income 
rises.  This reform was originally to have applied to Tax Credits as well but will now 
only apply to Universal Credit, which is gradually replacing Tax Credits. 
 
 Tax Credits 
Reductions in payments and thresholds, notably the removal for new claims of the 
‘family’ element and a limit on the ‘child’ element to two children for children born 
after March 2017 
 
 Mortgage interest support 
Change from welfare payment to a loan.  Loans accrue interest and will be repaid 
upon the sale of the house or when claimants return to work. 
 
 LHA cap in the social rented sector 
Housing Benefit for new tenancies in the social sector limited to the equivalent local 
private sector rate – the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) determined by age, 
household composition and location 
 
 Housing Benefit: 18-21 year olds 
End of entitlement for new claims to Universal Credit by out-of-work 18-21 year olds, 
with exemptions for vulnerable groups and those who live independently and have 
worked continuously for the preceding six months 
 
 Employment and Support Allowance 
Reduction in ESA payments to the Jobseeker’s Allowance rate for new claimants 
placed in the Work-Related Activity Group 
 
 
                                                          
12
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2016) op. cit. referred to these as ‘Universal Credits tapers and 
thresholds’.  ‘Work allowances’ is a more accurate terminology. 
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 Benefit cap 
Lower ceiling per household - £23,000 a year in London, £20,000 elsewhere – 
applying to the total of a wide range of working age benefits 
 
 Benefit freeze 
Four-year freeze in the value of most working age benefits, including tax credits and 
the Local Housing Allowance within Housing Benefit and Universal Credit 
 
Further details of each of these new reforms, including the timing of implementation, are 
contained in the appendix. 
 
Additionally the Westminster Government announced a new requirement – ‘Pay to Stay’ – 
for higher income tenants in the social rented sector to pay market rents and a 1 per cent a 
year reduction in social sector rents for four years, intended to reduce spending on Housing 
Benefit, which impacts financially on landlords rather than tenants.  These measures apply 
only in England.  In Scotland (and in Wales) social sector rents are a devolved matter. 
 
Table 2 shows the resulting financial loss to claimants across Britain as a whole in each 
financial year up to 2020-21.  These are all the Treasury’s own estimates, updated in most 
cases by the revised figures published in the March 2016 Budget13.  They also include the 
further loss to claimants that can be expected from the on-going changeover from DLA to 
PIP initiated prior to 2015. 
 
 
Table 2: Expected financial loss to claimants from post-2015 welfare reforms, GB, £m 
  
2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 
Benefit freeze 0 505 1,755 3,470 3,580 
UC work allowances 120 1,225 2,225 2,850 3,190 
Tax Credits 260 995 1,640 2,030 2,255 
PIP 810 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680 
ESA 0 30 180 345 450 
LHA cap in social sector 0 0 205 310 375 
Benefit cap (extension) 70  215 235 295 340 
Mortgage interest support -30 -35 265 245 245 
‘Pay to stay’  0 275 100 155 140 
HB: 18-21 year olds 0 25 35 40 40 
      
Total 1,230 4,915 8,320 11,420 12,295 
      
% of 2020-21 total 10 40 68 93 100 
      
 
Source: HM Treasury 
                                                          
13
 Figures for the LHA cap exclude the impact of the revisions affecting supported housing, 
announced in September 2016, for which financial data has not yet been published. 
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Across Britain as a whole, the Treasury expects the additional loss to claimants to grow to 
£12.3bn a year by 2020-21.  By comparison, by March 2016 the equivalent loss to claimants 
arising from the pre-2015 reforms, again across Britain as a whole, is estimated to be 
£14.9bn a year.  In effect, the pace of welfare reform, or more specifically the pace of the 
financial losses, looks set to slow little if at all.  By the spring of 2021, the cumulative loss to 
claimants arising from all the welfare reforms since 2010 is therefore likely to be some £27bn 
a year. 
 
After a slow start in the year to March 2017, when the changeover to PIP accounts for some 
two-thirds of the financial loss, the Treasury expects the losses attributable to the new 
reforms to accelerate.  The rate of increase then slows again at the end of the decade.  
Slippage in the timetable for implementing Universal Credit, a persistent problem, may 
however push some of the financial loss to claimants further away in time. 
 
Over the 2016-21 period as a whole, the Treasury expects to save most from the benefit 
freeze, the revised work allowances in Universal Credit and reductions in Tax Credits.  The 
changeover from DLA to PIP – still rolling forward from earlier years – also accounts for 
large sums. 
 
 
The financial losses in Scotland 
 
The Treasury does not publish estimates of the expected financial losses in Scotland, or in 
any other part of Britain.  As with the losses arising from the pre-2015 reforms, shown 
earlier, the figures for Scotland presented below are again estimates based primarily on the 
Treasury’s expected savings across Britain as a whole and local data on the distribution of 
benefit claimants and spending.  The estimates also take account of additional information in 
the Impact Assessments published by the UK Government. 
 
Table 3 presents our estimates of the financial loss to claimants in Scotland.  The figures 
here are for the expected losses in 2020-21, which is as far ahead as the Treasury’s own 
projections currently extend.  By this time most of the new welfare reforms are expected to 
be fully implemented. 
 
By 2020-21, we estimate that the overall financial loss to claimants in Scotland arising from 
the new, post-2015 welfare reforms will be £1,040m a year.  This compares to a financial 
loss by March 2016 arising from the pre-2015 reforms of £1,130m a year (see Table 1 
earlier) and will therefore bring the cumulative loss to claimants in Scotland from all the post-
2010 welfare reforms up to approaching £2.2bn a year. 
 
As across the UK as a whole, the benefit freeze and the reductions in Universal Credit work 
allowances are expected to lead to the biggest financial losses in Scotland.  The completion 
of the changeover from DLA to PIP also results in large losses because of the high number 
of claimants in Scotland.  The reductions in Tax Credits are a smaller source of financial loss 
because Scotland has fewer large families exposed to the new restrictions on eligibility. 
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Table 3: Estimated financial loss to claimants in Scotland from post-2015 welfare reforms by 
2020-21 
  
Estimated 
          loss 
 £m p.a. 
 
Number of 
households or 
individuals(2) 
adversely affected 
Average loss per  
affected 
h'hold/individual 
 £ p.a. 
Benefit freeze 300 700,000 450 
Universal Credit work allowances 250 240,000 1,050 
Personal Independence Payments(1) 190 70,000 2,600 
Tax Credits 140 150,000 950 
Employment and Support Allowance 65 70,000 900 
LHA cap in social rented sector 40 55,000 750 
Benefit cap (extension) 25 11,000 2,400 
Mortgage interest support 25 17,000 1,450 
HB: 18-21 year olds 4 1,500 2,600 
    
Total 1,040 n.a. n.a. 
    
(1) Additional post-2015-16 impact of pre-2015 reform  
(2) Individuals for PIP, ESA and 18-21s; households for all other benefits 
 
Sources: HM Treasury, Impact Assessments and Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
 
The numbers of people affected by each of the new reforms varies considerably.  The 
benefit freeze affects the largest number because it applies to nearly all working-age 
benefits, though the loss to each household or individual is relatively small.  There is also 
uncertainty about the final scale of the loss of course, because it depends on inflation rates 
across the economy some years ahead.  By contrast, the average loss to individuals who 
lose out as a result of the changeover to Personal Independence Payments is likely to be 
quite large14. 
 
The new, extended Benefit Cap is worth singling out.  The number of households likely to be 
affected in Scotland is an apparently modest 11,000 but this compares with just 900 affected 
by the existing pre-2016 cap, which mainly impacted in London where very high rents 
pushed significant numbers above the £26,000 threshold.  The new Benefit Cap – £20,000 a 
year in Scotland – is set to bite harder on larger numbers.  The average financial loss per 
household also looks likely to be substantial – more than £2,000 a year. 
 
What is worth bearing in mind is that some individuals and households are affected by more 
than one element of the reform package.  It is possible, for example, that a working-age 
claimant with health problems or disabilities will find that their ESA is reduced and at the 
same time they lose out though the changeover from DLA to PIP.  They may also lose 
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 The most recent Treasury estimates of the financial losses associated with the changeover from 
DLA to PIP were published in 2013 before the changeover was substantially underway. 
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entitlement Tax Credits if they have children, could be hit by the LHA cap if they live in social 
housing, and the benefit freeze will affect them too. 
 
By contrast, pensioner households are mostly unaffected by the new welfare reforms, as 
they were by the pre-2015 reforms.  This has been a deliberate policy choice by the 
Westminster Government, which has targeted welfare reform at men and women of working 
age with the explicit intention of increasing the financial incentives to find work or, for those 
already in work, to increase their earnings.  The State Pension, in particular, has been 
exempted from the new reforms and the DLA to PIP changeover only applies to working-age 
claimants.  To lose out financially as a result of the new reforms a pensioner household must 
be a new social housing tenant affected by the LHA cap, or a recipient of mortgage interest 
support, or still be able to claim Tax Credits for a child.  Small numbers of pensioners fall into 
these groups. 
 
Because of the overlapping impact of the reforms it is not possible here to provide an 
estimate of the total number of households or individuals losing out financially, or their 
average loss.  Only the numbers affected by each element of the reforms are included in 
Table 3 and they should not be summed to create a total.  However, the benefit freeze alone 
means that at least 700,000 will face a loss.  Moreover, this is a ‘snapshot’ at a single point 
in time.  Because the individuals and households that make up the stock of claimants is 
changing all the time, as people move on and off benefit, the numbers in Scotland who lose 
out financially at some point can probably be expected to comfortably exceed one million. 
 
The way in which financial losses will be experienced by claimants in Scotland is 
nevertheless worth noting.  The Westminster Government has ensured that relatively few 
people will actually experience a reduction in the cash value of the benefits they are already 
receiving.  The benefit freeze, for example, reduces the value of payments in real rather than 
cash terms.  Several of the reductions in entitlement also apply only to new claims.  These 
include: 
  Reduced Universal Credit work allowances  Restrictions on ‘child’ and ‘family’ elements of Tax Credits  Lower ESA payment rates  LHA cap in social sector (new tenancies only)  End of automatic entitlement to HB for out-of-work 18-21s 
 
So the financial loss from these elements of the reform package will be experienced not as a 
reduction in an existing payment but as a lower entitlement than would previously have been 
the case.  This is a benefit cut nonetheless. 
 
It is worth bearing in mind too that benefit claimants are not a fixed group of men and 
women.  There is regular turnover, particularly among the claimant unemployed for example.  
As a result, a person returning to benefit after a gap of a few months is often likely to find 
that their entitlement has been reduced.  Likewise, a change of circumstances that triggers a 
review of Universal Credit entitlement will mean that the new rules, and lower entitlement, 
will apply. 
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The large savings attributable to the changeover to Personal Independence Payments are 
different because as the re-testing of existing DLA claimants proceeds the losses will be 
reductions in existing cash payments.  Likewise, the new, lower Benefit Cap will reduce the 
cash entitlement of existing claimants.  It is these reductions in existing payments that are 
likely to trigger the greatest complaints.  If new social sector tenants fail to log that from April 
2018 onwards they could face a reduction in Housing Benefit there are likely to be further 
complaints. 
 
 
The impact by local authority 
 
Table 4 shows the estimated financial loss to claimants arising from the new welfare reforms 
by local authority across Scotland.  In this table the authorities are ranked by the loss per 
adult of working age.  This adjusts for the differing population of the authorities and is the 
best measure of the intensity of the ‘hit’ in each area.  This measure also reflects the almost 
exclusive focus of the losses on men and women working age. 
 
The biggest impact in absolute terms and on a per capita basis falls on Glasgow, where by 
2020-21 the post-2015 welfare reforms are estimated to result in a loss of £167m a year, 
equivalent to £400 a year for every adult of working age in the city.  On per capita basis a 
number of other older industrial areas are also hit hard.  These include West 
Dunbartonshire, Inverclyde, Dundee, North Lanarkshire and North and East Ayrshire. 
 
By contrast, the financial loss to Edinburgh – an estimated £78m a year, or £230 per adult of 
working age – is significantly smaller. 
 
The parts of Scotland that are least affected by the reforms are in North East Scotland, 
Orkney and Shetland, and two relatively affluent districts (East Renfrewshire and East 
Dunbartonshire) in the central belt.  However, it is worth noting that even in some of these 
local authorities the absolute losses remain large.  Aberdeen residents, for example, can still 
expect to be £29m a year worse off than they would have been if the old benefit rules had 
continued to apply. 
 
There are no surprises in this geography.  In fact, it is remarkably similar to the picture we 
identified in our 2013 report on the impact of the earlier round of welfare reforms15, in which 
Glasgow was again the worst affected place.  In effect, the new welfare reforms reinforce the 
loss of income in the places worst-hit by the pre-2015 round of reforms.  Broadly speaking, 
the parts of Scotland hit hardest by the new round of reform (such as Glasgow) lose twice as 
much on a per capita basis as the least affected local authorities, and around 30 per cent 
more than the average across Scotland as a whole of £300 a year per adult of working age. 
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 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2013) op. cit. 
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Table 4: Estimated financial loss to claimants from post-2015 welfare reforms by 2020-21, by 
local authority 
  
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age 
adult 
£ p.a. 
 Glasgow  167 400 
 West Dunbartonshire  23 390 
 North Ayrshire  33 380 
 Inverclyde  19 370 
 Dundee  36 360 
 North Lanarkshire  78 350 
 East Ayrshire  27 350 
 Renfrewshire  38 340 
 Dumfries and Galloway  30 330 
 West Lothian  38 330 
 Clackmannanshire  11 330 
 Fife  74 320 
 Midlothian  17 320 
 South Ayrshire  22 320 
 South Lanarkshire  64 310 
 Falkirk  30 290 
 East Lothian  18 280 
 Scottish Borders  19 280 
 Angus  20 270 
 Highland  39 270 
 Argyll and Bute  14 270 
 Eilean Siar  4 260 
 Perth and Kinross  24 260 
 Moray  14 240 
 Stirling  14 230 
 Edinburgh  78 230 
 East Renfrewshire  12 220 
 Orkney Islands  3 210 
 East Dunbartonshire  13 200 
 Aberdeen 29 180 
 Aberdeenshire  28 170 
 Shetland Islands  2 160 
  
  
 Scotland  1,040 300 
  
  
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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It is to be expected that welfare reforms hit hardest in the places where welfare claimants 
are concentrated, which in turn tend to be the poorest areas with the highest rates of 
worklessness.  To underline this point, Figure 1 shows the relationship between the financial 
losses arising from the post-2015 welfare reforms (measured in terms of the loss per adult of 
working age) and the share of the datazones16 in each local authority in the most deprived 
20 per cent in Scotland (from the Scottish Indices of Deprivation 2016).  There is a clear and 
unambiguous relationship: as a general rule, the more deprived the local authority, the 
greater the financial hit.  What the regression line in Figure 1 tells us is that for every 10 
percentage point increase in the share of population in the most deprived 20 per cent of 
Scottish datazones, the financial loss arising from the new welfare reforms increases by 
around £40 a year per adult of working age. 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between deprivation and estimated financial loss by 2020-21 arising 
from post-2015 welfare reforms, by local authority 
 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates and Scottish Indices of Deprivation 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Datazones are small geographical units with between 500 and 1,000 residents. 
 16 
Comparisons with the rest of Britain 
 
Table 5 compares the financial loss in Scotland with the rest of Britain.  What is clear here is 
that although the anticipated financial loss in Scotland is large – a little over £1bn a year by 
2020-21– it is in fact quite close to the average for Great Britain as a whole – the Scottish 
loss of £300 a year per adult of working age compares to the GB average of £310 a year. 
 
 
Table 5: Estimated financial loss to claimants by 2020-21 arising from post-2015 welfare 
reforms, by region and country 
  
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 North West  1,630 360 
 North East  590 360 
 Wales  680 360 
 West Midlands  1,250 350 
 Yorkshire and the Humber  1,170 350 
 East Midlands  920 320 
 London  1,770 300 
 Scotland  1,040 300 
 South West  930 280 
 East  990 270 
 South East  1,320 240 
  
  
 Great Britain  12,295 310
  
  
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
 
A number of other parts of Britain are in fact hit harder.  Wales and the three regions of 
northern England all come above Scotland in this particular ranking.  So do the East and 
West Midlands.  That Scotland loses less, per adult of working age, than some of the English 
regions is partly because the Westminster Government’s new ‘Pay to Stay’ arrangements for 
higher-income social sector tenants do not apply in Scotland.  But Scotland’s position in the 
rankings also reflects the fact that as well as having clearly deprived areas, notably in the 
West, it also includes a number of prosperous sub-regions – the Edinburgh and Aberdeen 
areas in particular.  These dilute the average financial loss across Scotland as a whole. 
 
On the other hand, the remaining regions of southern and eastern England outside London, 
generally regarded as covering some of the most prosperous parts of the UK, are on a per 
capita basis all hit less hard than Scotland. 
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Will the loss of income be offset? 
 
Welfare reform is of course only one of several things happening simultaneously.  It is not 
within the scope of the present report to cover all these in detail but the extent to which the 
financial losses might be offset, at least for some people, deserves comment. 
 
The increase in personal tax allowances is one offsetting factor.  Over the 2010-15 period 
the Coalition government increased the personal allowance for Income Tax by more than the 
rate of inflation.  In its 2015 Summer Budget, the Conservative government pledged to 
further increase the allowance from £10,600 in 2015-16 to £12,500 by 2020-21. 
 
Two points are worth bearing in mind about the impact of changes in personal allowances.  
The first is that only a proportion of benefit claimants actually pay Income Tax.  Those in full-
time employment will typically do so but there are many others – especially women – in low-
paid part-time employment who have an income below tax thresholds.  Those on out-of-work 
benefits will generally be in this position too.  The other point is the scale of the tax changes.  
Raising the personal allowance by £1,900 a year between 2015-16 and 2020-21 is worth 
£380 a year to the individual taxpayer (at a 20 per cent tax rate), but around half of this 
increase might have been expected anyway if the allowance had been uprated in line with 
inflation17. 
 
The introduction of the National Living Wage is a second offsetting factor.  From April 2016 
this is £7.20 an hour for workers aged 25 or more – an increase of 70p compared to the 
previous minimum wage – and it is the government’s aspiration to raise the National Living 
Wage to over £9 an hour by 2020.  In the short-run the government expects this to boost the 
earnings of 2.7m low wage workers, with knock-on effects further up the wage distribution for 
perhaps a further 3.25m18. 
 
Whilst the introduction of the National Living Wage boosts earnings of the low paid, revised 
work allowances within Universal Credit increase the withdrawal of financial support from 
many of the same people.  On balance, many of the low paid are likely to find that they are 
little if at all better off.  Illustrative figures in Summer Budget 2015 suggest that the combined 
effect of welfare reform, personal tax changes and the National Living Wage will be to 
generate a range of both positive and negative changes in real income by 2020-21, 
depending on household structure and hours worked (if any). 
 
Discretionary Housing Payments are a potential third offsetting factor.  These are 
payments administered by local authorities to provide additional support to help meet 
housing costs for those in receipt of Housing Benefit or the housing component of Universal 
Credit. 
 
Two points need to be noted about Discretionary Housing Payments.  First, the Westminster 
Government’s financial allocation of £800m, in the Summer Budget 2015, is for a five year 
period so on an annual basis it averages only £160m, and Scotland’s proportional share is 
only around £15m a year.  Second, the Scottish Government is already committed to 
                                                          
17
 Office for Budget Responsibility inflation forecast in Summer Budget 2015 
18
 Source: HM Treasury (2015) Summer Budget 2015, op. cit. 
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spending the whole of this sum – and substantially more – to continuing to offset the 
‘bedroom tax’. 
 
A fourth offsetting factor is the extension of support for childcare.  From early 2017, the 
Westminster Government is introducing tax-free childcare up to the value of £2,000 per 
child.  In England, the Westminster Government is also funding additional free childcare for 
working parents of 3 and 4 year olds from September 2017.  In Scotland, the same 
entitlement is planned to increase from 15 to 30 hours a week by the end of the current 
Parliament and will in addition cover around a quarter of 2 year olds.  The increase is 
estimated to be worth up to £2,500 a year per child19.  The net cost to the Exchequer of the 
recently-announced changes, including restrictions on the entitlement of the highest earners, 
is estimated to be £585m a year in 2020-2120. 
 
For some households these reductions in childcare costs are substantial and they will go a 
long way towards offsetting, perhaps even entirely, the loss of income arising from the 
welfare reform package.  On the other hand it is worth bearing in mind that the financial loss 
to households with dependent children arising from welfare reform extends far beyond just 
those with 3 and 4 year olds.  Also, at least some of the financial benefit of the reduction in 
childcare costs will feed through to middle and upper-income households in work who do not 
draw on the benefit system to any significant extent and are largely unaffected by the welfare 
reforms. 
 
Taken as a whole, all these parallel changes in taxation, wages and entitlement go some 
way to offsetting the financial losses arising from welfare reform.  However, it is clear that the 
winners and the losers are unlikely to be the same people.  It also looks unlikely that the full 
financial loss will be offset in this way. 
 
 
Will more people find employment? 
 
Westminster ministers take the view that the welfare reforms increase the financial incentive 
to take up employment and because more people will look for work more people will find 
work.  In this view, employment will be higher and the loss of benefit income will be offset in 
whole or in part by an increase in earnings. 
 
What is true is that since 2012, at around the time that many of the first round of welfare 
reforms began to bite, UK employment has grown strongly – more strongly indeed than 
normal given the modest growth in output.  It would be wrong, however, to assume that 
welfare reform has been the trigger.  Other factors almost certainly lie at the root of the 
upturn – the revival in household borrowing, especially around the housing market, the 
recovery of the world economy and exceptionally low interest rates. The reforms to out-of-
work benefits do however increase the financial incentive to work. 
 
On the other hand, even before the reforms began most out-of-work claimants would have 
been financially better off in employment.  Financial disincentives only came into play for 
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 Source: Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015 
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 Sources: Summer Budget 2015 and Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015 
 19 
relatively small numbers at specific cut-off points in the system.  Moreover, some reforms to 
in-work benefits – the changes to Universal Credit work allowances for example – have the 
opposite effect, making work less financially rewarding, and many in employment may find it 
difficult to increase their working hours to offset the loss of income. 
 
For claimants of Employment and Support Allowance, who are by far the largest group on 
out-of-work benefits in Scotland and elsewhere, it is also questionable whether increasing 
the financial incentive to work really addresses their obstacles to employment.  For some 
ESA claimants health problems or disabilities pose a formidable barrier, and even for those 
closer to the labour market there are generally unresolved health issues.  Additionally, ESA 
claimants are disproportionately concentrated in the weaker local labour markets where 
employers are generally able to recruit plenty of fit and healthy workers. 
 
Central to the view that employment will rise in the wake of the welfare reforms is the 
assumption that extra labour supply leads to extra labour demand from employers.  Whether 
labour markets really do work in this way is deeply questionable.  There are times and 
places where a shortage of labour can bottle-up economic growth but particularly in the 
places where the local economy is weak – which is where so many out-of-work claimants 
are concentrated – the likelihood of an increase in labour supply triggering an increase in 
employment is low.  Some individuals will undoubtedly find work to compensate for the loss 
of benefit income but whether the overall level of employment will be any higher as a result 
is questionable.  More often than not, the claimants finding work will simply fill vacancies that 
would have gone to other jobseekers, thereby transferring unemployment from one person 
to another. 
 
Our pilot study in Scotland21 found that the unemployment (JSA) claimant rate has fallen 
fastest in the local authorities where the financial losses from welfare reform have been 
largest.  Closer examination, however, showed that the same areas – which were the places 
that started with the highest unemployment – also experienced the biggest reductions in 
unemployment in previous economic upturns, long before the implementation of welfare 
reform. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Important elements of the welfare system are being devolved to Scotland and this will no 
doubt command attention in the Scottish Parliament.  In total the devolved benefits 
accounted for £3.1bn spending in Scotland in 2014-15, compared to £15bn spent in 
Scotland via the benefits reserved to Westminster, split fairly evenly between working-age 
and retirement benefits22. 
 
However, the devolution of welfare powers should not obscure the continuing role of that 
Westminster plays in determining benefit spending in Scotland.  In particular, it is important 
to keep in mind the major impact on Scotland of the welfare reforms initiated by the 
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 C Beatty, S Fothergill and D Houston (2015) op. cit. 
22
 K Wane, K Berry, C Kidner and N Georghiou (2016) New Social Security Powers, SPICe briefing 
16/45, Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh 
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Westminster Government since the 2015 general election.  From the claimant’s perspective, 
what matters is not who controls the levers but how much they will receive, and for many this 
is set to be reduced. 
 
In this report we have estimated that the post-2015 welfare reforms will result in a financial 
loss to claimants in Scotland of just over £1bn a year by 2020-21.  This comes on top of an 
earlier financial loss of £1.1bn a year by March 2016 arising from the welfare reforms 
implemented by the Westminster Government between 2010 and 2015.  Even the devolved 
benefits do not escape unscathed: by the time that responsibility for Personal Independence 
Payments is devolved in 2018, we estimate that a further £190m a year will have been taken 
from claimants in Scotland as a result of the on-going replacement of DLA by PIP.  As a 
result, a smaller budget line will eventually be handed over. 
 
Welfare claimants in Scotland have lost large sums already, and are set to lose further large 
sums.  The devolution of welfare powers will not in itself alter this stark reality. 
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APPENDIX 2: Details of statistical sources and methods 
 
 
 
PERSONAL INDEPENDENCE PAYMENTS 
 
Payments intended to help offset the additional financial costs faced by individuals of all ages with 
disabilities, including those both in and out of work 
 
Nature of reform 
  Phased replacement of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) for working-age claimants by Personal 
Independence Payments (PIP), from 2013-14  Introduction of more stringent medical test and regular re-testing  Reduction in number of payment categories 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£2,870m a year by 2017-18, of which £1,680m a year arises after 2015-16 
(Source: HM Treasury revised estimate, Budget 2013) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  DWP anticipate a reduction in the national caseload of working age of 600,000 (see National 
Audit Office (2014) Personal Independence Payment: early progress, NAO, London), up from an 
original DWP estimate of 450,000.  Additionally, 510,000 claimants in receipt of PIP instead of 
DLA are anticipated to experience a reduction in payment. 
  Numbers allocated on the basis of stock of working age DLA claimants in each local authority in 
February 2012 (Source: DWP). 
  Financial loss allocated to each local authority in GB on basis of reduction in claimant numbers 
 
 
 
UNIVERSAL CREDIT WORK ALLOWANCES 
 
Benefit withdrawal as income of Universal Credit (UC) claimant rises 
 
Nature of reforms 
  Reduction in the level of earnings at which UC awards start to be withdrawn, from April 2016 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£3,190m a year (net) by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Budget 2016) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Overall loss allocated on the basis of the total number of families in work in receipt of CTC or 
WTC in December 2015, by local authority across GB (Source: HMRC Child and Working Tax 
Credits Statistics: geographical analysis) 
  All families in work in receipt of CTC or WTC affected by the changes 
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TAX CREDITS (new reforms) 
 
Payments through the tax system to lower and middle income households, initially as Child Tax Credit 
and Working Tax Credit and eventually Universal Credit 
 
Nature of reforms 
  Limiting of child element to two children for new births in tax credits and new UC claims, from 
April 2017 (£1,585m a year by 2020-21)  Removal of family element in tax credits and UC, and the family premium in Housing Benefit, for 
new claims, from April 2017 (£645m a year by 2020-21)  Reduction in income rise disregard in tax credits, from April 2016 (£55m a year by 2020-21)  Uprated minimum income floor in UC for self-employed from 2016-17 (£185m a year by 2020-21)  Revised UC delivery schedule (£215m extra spending in 2020-21 but net saving in earlier years) 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£2,255m a year (net) by 2020-21 
(Sources: HM Treasury Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015 and Budget 2016) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Estimated numbers of households affected by child element (640,000) from DWP Impact 
Assessment: Tax Credits and Universal Credit, changes to Child Element and Family Element 
  30 per cent of other tax credit claimants in December 2015 (Source: HMRC) assumed to be 
affected by one or more of the other changes.  Family element is expected to affect 1,180,000 
households (Source: DWP Impact Assessment above) but there is overlap with those affected by 
the child element. 
  70 per cent of financial loss (more than two children element) allocated on basis of number of 
families in receipt of Child Tax Credit multiplied by an index of the share of households with three 
or more dependent children in each local authority relative to the GB average in 2011 (Source: 
Census of Population). 
  30 per cent of financial loss (remaining measures) allocated on basis of numbers in receipt of tax 
credits in December 2015 (Source: HMRC Child and Working Tax Credits: geographical analysis) 
  Total numbers affected in each local authority across GB allocated in proportion to financial 
losses 
 
 
 
MORTGAGE INTEREST SUPPORT 
 
Assistance with mortgage payments for out-of-work claimant 
 
Nature of the reform 
  Change from welfare payment to loan, from April 2016 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£245m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Budget 2016) 
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Methods and data sources 
  170,000 households affected (Source: DWP Welfare Reform and Work Bill: impact assessment 
for converting support for mortgage interest from a benefit into a loan). 
  Number of households affected and financial loss allocated to local authorities across GB in 
proportion to working-age benefit claimant numbers in each authority in May 2015 (Source: DWP) 
multiplied by an index of the share of households in owner-occupied housing relative to the GB 
average in 2011 (Source: Census of Population) 
 
 
 
LHA CAP IN SOCIAL RENTED SECTOR 
 
Support with housing costs for social sector tenants 
 
Nature of the reform 
  Housing Benefit in the social sector limited to the equivalent private sector rate for tenancies 
signed after 1 April 2016, with entitlement changing from 1 April 2018 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£375m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Budget 2016) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Financial loss arising from LHA cap allocated in proportion to number of households in social 
housing claiming Housing Benefit in each local authority across GB in August 2015 multiplied by 
the ratio between the value of the average Housing Benefit claims in the social and private rented 
sectors in August 2015 (Sources: DWP) 
  In absence of published government estimates, the number of households affected assumed to 
be 500,000 (given the Treasury’s anticipated financial saving, this equates to an average loss of 
£15 per week per household).  Numbers allocated in proportion to the financial losses. 
 
 
 
HOUSING BENEIT: 18-21 YEAR OLDS 
 
Support with housing costs for young people 
 
Nature of the reform 
  End of automatic Housing Benefit entitlement for out-of-work 18-21 year olds, from April 2017 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£40m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Budget 2016) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  In absence of government estimates, but in line with anticipated financial saving, numbers 
affected assumed to be 15,000, equating to an average loss of roughly £50 a week 
  Number and financial losses allocated in proportion to the out-of-work claimant rate among under-
25s in each local authority across GB in May 2015 (Source: DWP) 
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EMPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT ALLOWANCE (new reforms) 
 
Out-of-work payments to men and women of working age with health problems or disabilities 
 
Nature of the reform 
  ESA in Work-Related Activity Group reduced to JSA rate for new claims 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£450m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Budget 2016) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Numbers affected (500,000) from DWP Impact Assessment: remove the ESA Work-Related 
Activity Component and the UC Limited Capability for Work Element for new claims 
  Numbers affected and financial losses allocated in proportion to the numbers claiming ESA in the 
WRAG group in each local authority across GB in May 2015 (Source: DWP) 
 
 
 
BENEFIT CAP (extension) 
 
Ceiling on total payments to out-of-work households applying to sum of wide range of working age 
benefits 
 
Nature of reform 
  New, lower ceiling set at £23,000 a year in London and £20,000 elsewhere, from 2016-17 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£340m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Budget 2016) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Households already capped in London (10,000) and in the rest of Britain (13,000) lose £3,000 a 
year and £6,000 a year respectively.  Numbers are averages for March-August 2015 (Source 
DWP).  Households already capped therefore lose £108m a year. 
  Remaining financial loss to newly capped households (£232m a year) expected to average £39 
per week, or £2,000 a year.  (Source: DWP Welfare Reform and Work Bill: impact assessment for 
the benefit cap).  This equates to 115,000 newly-capped households. 
  24 per cent of all households affected by the new cap (140,000) expected to be in London and 76 
per cent elsewhere (Source: DWP Welfare Reform and Work Bill: impact assessment for the 
benefit cap).  Implies 23,000 newly-capped households in London and 93,000 elsewhere. 
  Financial loss to newly-capped households in London limited to £3,000 a year and assumed to be 
an average of £1,300 a year (£30m in total) 
  Loss of remaining £202m a year to 93,000 newly capped households outside London therefore 
estimated to average £2,200 a year 
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 Number of newly capped households affected in London and in the rest of GB allocated to each 
local authority: one-third in proportion to number on out-of-work benefits in May 2015 (Source: 
DWP); one-third in proportion to the ratio between the local share of households with 3 or more 
children and the GB average in 2011 (Source: Census of Population); and one-third in proportion 
to the ratio between the local value of Housing Benefit awards and the GB average in August 
2015 (Source: DWP) 
 
 
 
BENEFIT FREEZE 
 
Below-inflation uprating of benefits 
 
Nature of reform 
  Freeze in value of most working-age benefits for four years from 2016-17 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£3,580m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Budget 2016) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Total loss divided 40:60 between DWP-administrated benefits and HMRC-administrated benefits 
(Child Benefit, CTC, WTC), reflecting the current split of overall expenditure on relevant benefits 
(Sources: DWP and HMRC) 
  HMRC benefits loss allocated on basis of total number of families in receipt of CTC or WTC by 
local authority across GB in December 2015, (Source: HMRC Child and Working Tax Credits: 
geographical analysis) 
  DWP benefits loss divided 70:30 between working age benefits and Housing Benefit, reflecting 
the current split of overall expenditure on relevant benefits (Source: DWP) 
  DWP working age benefits loss allocated on basis of out-of-work working age benefit numbers in 
May 2015, by local authority across GB (Source: DWP) 
  Housing Benefit loss allocated on basis of number claimants and average award in the private 
rented sector, by local authority across GB (Source: DWP) 
  Estimated 30 per cent of all households affected (Source: DWP Welfare Reform and Work Bill: 
impact assessment of the benefit rate freeze).  Allocated to local authorities across GB in 
proportion to the sum of the numbers in receipt of Child Benefit in December 2015 (Source: 
HMRC) and out-of-work working-age benefits in May 2015 (Source: DWP). 
 
